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A Forgotten Golden Era: Modernism in Late-Mao China, 1969-76

This paper will investigate a forgotten ‘golden era’ of modernism in late-Mao China, the seven years from 1969 to 1976, a period still within the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), but immediately after the first three years of turmoil. In this period the most important state buildings resolutely adopted modernism. This contrasts with the 1950s-60s, when modernism was tested, criticized and sidelined. If one looks at a long history from the 1930s to the more contemporary period after the 1980s, one finds that the 1970s witnessed the climax of modernism in China. However, due to various reasons including the prevailing denouncement of the Cultural Revolution and an insufficient understanding of modernism in Mao’s China, this climax has been largely overlooked by existing scholarship. This paper aims to shed light on this gap in the historiography of modernism in China, through case studies on two clusters of buildings, namely, the diplomatic projects in Beijing and the foreign trade projects in Guangzhou. A theoretical framework centred on a triangular relation of form, politics, and knowledge is adopted to scrutinize the two cases. Various sources of knowledge including Western modernism and indigenous architectural traditions were utilized to create new forms of modernist buildings with ‘Chineseness’ embedded, as a response to the political requirements of Chinese national identity. The paper further concludes that the responsive and adaptive strategy adopted by architects in Mao’s China was the key to success in creating new architectural forms in the historically defined context of politics and knowledge.
Recent years have seen a rising interest in re-writing the history of architectural modernism in the twentieth century under the notion of “multiple modernisms” in different social, cultural and political contexts. To contribute to this global academic discourse, this paper re-examines modernism in Mao’s China (1949-76) and focuses on the late-Mao period, more specifically, the seven years from 1969 to 1976. This period seems to be a blind point neglected by previous scholarship due to various reasons, such as the prevailing distorted perception that the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) was a ‘ten-year turmoil’, and that architecture in Mao’s China was only in an eclectic National Style. First of all, the Cultural Revolution is not totally a destructive period that lasted for ten years. Instead, it was sharply split into two phases by the year of 1969: the high Cultural Revolution (1966-69), which was in the deep turmoil, and the mid- and late-periods (1969-76) when economic development and urban construction gradually resumed at a considerable speed. As to the architecture of the Mao era, in the changing political atmosphere of the early 1970s, a new wave of architecture, which was distinctively different from the previous National Style in the 1950s, and closer to the prewar and postwar modernism in the West, emerged. It was first exemplified by several clusters of buildings such as foreign diplomatic projects in Beijing, foreign trade projects in Guangzhou and foreign aid projects overseas, then quickly spread to the whole country. The seven years of the late-Mao era is arguably a ‘golden’ era of modernism in China, if situated in a long history from the 1930s to the more contemporary period after the 1980s. In the 1930s and 1950s, under the nationalist and communist regimes respectively, the key state buildings adopted a National Style based on the formal and visual imitation of traditional palatial architecture of China. Also, the climax of modernism of the 1970s didn’t last long into the 1980s when economic reform began and multiple architectural trends came to China. Before focusing on the 1970s, a development trajectory of modernism in Mao’s China and the political context of the 1970s need to be unfolded.

The Historical Context: Politics and Architecture

Architectural modernism was deeply intertwined with socialist ideals at its beginning. However, when China’s communist regime was established in the early 1950s by Mao, modernism was not absorbed and recognized as a legitimate architectural form or style either for everyday buildings or for key state buildings that represented national identity. In the Cold War mentality, ‘modernism’ was associated with architectural forms of the ‘West’ and the ‘capitalism’. At the same time, the Soviet-inspired National Style was developed as the legitimate form for both key state buildings and everyday urban construction, which later caused the problem of ‘waste’. Functional modernism and the ostentatious National Style contested with each other throughout the 1950s, both experiencing dramatic ups and downs following the swings of policies. Briefly speaking, modernism was denounced in 1954 in the context of promoting the National Style, promoted in 1955 as a result of Anti-Waste Campaign, and criticized in 1957 in the political movement of the Anti-Rightist Campaign.

In the early 1960s, modernism was critically re-evaluated from a Marxist view by praising the success of early modernism in providing social housing, and denouncing the postwar modernism, which had degenerated to “formalism”. But the architectural discourse gradually muted, along with the leftist ideological propaganda which was lifted higher and gradually pushed to extremes in the context of Great Leap Forward (GLF, 1958-65) and the high Cultural Revolution (1966-9). In 1964, the Design Revolution was launched by Mao, targeting at the mistakes of “high, big, exotic, and old” in the design realm and in effect, a functionalism without attention to aesthetics was encouraged. But in the late-1960s, art was brought back into architecture to express the revolutionary spirit. In association with the high tide of artistic production in promoting leftist ideology in the Cultural Revolution, especially the creation of ‘model opera’, a ‘model architecture’ with a stronger expression of monumentality could also be identified, for example in the case of Capital Gymnasium in Beijing (1968). (Fig. 1) In terms of architectural language, this ‘model architecture’ lay somewhere between the National Style and modernism. It replaced pompous weight and ostentatious decorative elements with light, permeability and modernist details, but still kept the symmetrical classical composition of the façade but without the playful elaboration of a free-flowing spatial composition. It should be regarded as a formal creation in the Cultural Revolution, and a transitional form that influenced modernist buildings in the 1970s.
In the 1970s, international politics shifted to détente and the relation between China and the United States of America was restored in order to cope with the rising threat from the Soviet Union, culminating with President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. Before this, domestic state politics also changed dramatically. After Lin Biao, Mao’s successor, died in an alleged coup in 1971, Mao gradually stepped back from the central stage of power due to deteriorating health. But he was still directing his ‘two arms’ to steer the whole country until his death in 1976. Zhou Enlai, the prime minister as the pragmatist leader took charge of foreign affairs and domestic economic development, while the faction of Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife, controlled the apparatus of artistic production and propaganda, struggling to promote the far-leftist ideology. The pragmatists and radicals were constantly in opposition and struggling with each other in the political arena, but nevertheless, the country reached a ‘dynamic balance’, going simultaneously ‘left’, in terms of the radical ideology in art and propaganda, and ‘right’, in terms of pragmatist concerns in economic development and foreign affairs. As an official slogan summarized, “Grasp Revolution, Promote Production” became the mainstream consensus. In this political context, following ‘Mao’s revolutionary line of foreign policy’, several clusters of modernist buildings were proposed and built in Beijing and Guangzhou in preparation for the later increasing emphasis on foreign affairs, immediately after urban construction resumed around 1970. The distinctiveness of this batch of buildings is the confident and uncompromised expression of modernism, from general composition and façade language, to internal spatial layout and ways of applying decoration. As an idiom, it is lighter and more dynamic than the Soviet-influenced architecture in the 1950s, more exquisite and aesthetically conscious than the functionalism in the 1960s, and more humanistic in scale and playful in spatial design than the ‘model architecture’ of the high Cultural Revolution yet without compromise to solemnity and monumentality. For example, the diplomatic apartment buildings constructed in Beijing in the early 1970s formed a contrast with the old residential buildings built in the 1950s. (Fig. 2)
Form, Politics and Knowledge

How does one account for this group of modernist buildings, in particular, why was modernism recognized as the legitimate form for key state buildings in the early 1970s? It appears to be closely related to the changing politics in this period, especially the thawing of Cold War political tensions. But if one looks closely at the buildings’ forms, the inventiveness and many distinctive features cannot be simply explained within this rough ‘form-politics’ framework: many of the design tactics were linked to various inspirations of different sources of architectural knowledge, ranging from ancient China to the contemporary West. In other words, ‘architectural knowledge’ should be taken into the critical analysis and a more sophisticated theoretical framework centred on the triangular relation of form, politics and knowledge should be established.

Firstly, as to the ‘form-politics’ relation among these projects, four political aims were represented: 1) national identity or “Chineseness” was still an important requirement for architectural design if not so explicit as that in the 1950s, especially in the group of buildings related to foreign affairs; 2) the expression of state authority or solemnness, as a common issue for all monumental buildings, was emphasized; 3) Internationalism was expressed in the form of modernism, to show a welcoming posture to foreigners, especially Westerners; and 4) modernization or ‘modern’, as a discourse strongly advocated by Zhou Enlai in the 1970s, was also expressed in architecture. The latter two points obviously justified the adoption of modernism as an “international style”, however it could be further argued that modernism was adapted to the Chinese context to achieve the first two political aims. Moreover, the dynamic balance in politics created a great deal of ambiguous and contentious interpretation of architectural form, which will be elaborated in the case studies.

Secondly, as to the ‘form-knowledge’ relation, four bodies of knowledge were referenced for developing modernist form in the 1970s: 1) the knowledge of traditional Chinese architecture, which is embedded in the mentality of Chinese architects; 2) the prewar modernism inherited from the first generation of Chinese architects; 3) the design experience in the Mao era, including the influence from Soviet architecture in the 1950s, and the ‘model architecture’ created during the Cultural Revolution; and 4) contemporary Western architecture of the 1960s and 1970s selectively referenced by Chinese architects. These sources of knowledge were mixed and mingled in different ratios in different cases, to respond with varied emphasis to political aims.

Thirdly, the ‘politics-knowledge’ relation in the late-Mao era was also fascinating, in that the rigid political control didn’t totally constrain free creation by architects, it also facilitated knowledge production at the same time: 1) architectural communication with the West was supported by the state despite strict political controls and often in a secretive way; 2) foreign architectural knowledge was also systematically collected at the state level; 3) in certain times and places at the local level, for example, the information exchange between Guangzhou and Hong Kong in the 1970s was dynamic with the support from the local government if not directly from the central government; and 4) moreover, the institutional background of China also contributed to knowledge production, such as the design institute, the ‘collective design’ process, the ‘three combinations’ (architects, workers, and political leaders) working method should also be noted.

Among this intricate web of form, politics and knowledge, it is argued that a primary link can be identified regarding modernist buildings in the late-Mao era: new architectural form was created by creatively referencing Western modernism and Chinese indigenous architectural tradition to construct Chinese national identity. Two cases will be discussed and compared to prove and enrich this hypothesis.

Beijing

Beijing, as the capital, receives more impact from the policies of the central government compared to other cities. Historically, it was the main battlefield of styles in the 1950s, with the strongest obsession being the representation of national identity. In the 1970s, it was the first city to experience the changing politics in architecture. As early as in 1969, before the Sino-American Rapprochement in the 1972, a group of diplomatic projects were first proposed in Beijing, including the International Club (1969-72), Friendship Store (1969-72), and Diplomatic Residence Compound (D.R.C.) outside Jianguomen Gate, on the northern side of Chang’an Avenue. A design team in the Beijing Institute of Architectural Design (B.I.A.D.) led by young architect Wu Guanzhang undertook most of the design tasks. In 1971,
Wan Li and Zhao Pengfei, who were in charge of Beijing’s urban construction before the Cultural Revolution, began to work with Zhou Enlai in the newly restored planning bureau in the Beijing government, supervising these diplomatic projects and working closely with the architects. From 1972 to 1974, a state-level hotel project - Beijing Hotel East was designed by Zhang Bo, a veteran architect from B.I.A.D., receiving much attention directly from Zhou Enlai.

The built form of this new Beijing architecture seemed to be a mixture of ‘national form’ and modernism, as the influence of the National Style continued into the 1970s. But modernist spatial principles such as asymmetrical arrangement, flowing space, and the penetration of interior and exterior were evident. The International Club was representative among this group of diplomatic projects. (Fig. 3) According to Wu Guanzhang, “national form” was still required by Wan Li, Wu’s immediate superior, although the “big roof” was banned. The façade basically consists of three segments: base, body and top, reminiscent of traditional Chinese architecture; the entrances are always symmetrical to show solemnness; and many details such as balustrades are in the simplified forms of traditional Chinese architecture. Though Wu didn’t oppose the use of national form, he still showed a strong inclination towards modernism. According to Wu, there was no direct reference to foreign architecture, but he liked the architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright in particular. In the International Club, one can notice Wrightian influence in the overhanging eaves, the horizontal lines on the façade and the semi-circular reading room. Even the drawing style of the plan was more or less Wrightian, such as the drawing of trees, pergola, and the irregular pattern of stones which were attempts to incorporate a sense of nature into the plan. (Fig. 4) Besides this, the specific arrangement of walls, screens, and interior furnishing, which created the spatial rhythms, twists and turns and a sense of labyrinth, seemed to be learnt from traditional Chinese architecture. Not surprisingly, these features of traditional architecture were also quite ‘modernist’, given the deep resonance between the Eastern architecture and the architecture of Wright. As is well known, Wright was deeply inspired by Japanese architecture especially the Katsura Imperial Villa in Kyoto, which was a tribute to Chinese gardens.
Such a mix of forms was associated with the building’s function: a community centre and club exclusively for diplomats living in the D.R.C. The building aimed to display a certain national identity or ‘Chineseness’ to foreign diplomats as well as an image of the ‘modern’ to show the confidence of the Chinese in their own cultural tradition and to welcome international friends with modern facilities. The rich collection of paintings and decorative art installed in this building also impressively served this aim. In the early 1970s, a group of Chinese artists were specially appointed by Zhou Enlai to create art works for the diplomatic buildings. These works were in the traditional genre of Chinese art, such as traditional painting and calligraphy but in modern form and content, exemplified by *The high mountain and the flowing water*, a mural painting by Dong Shouping in the east entrance. 17 (Fig. 5)

Wu also admitted that the modernist feature of the ‘lightness’ in this group of buildings was learnt from architecture in the south where the climate is warmer and more appropriate for thin walls, overhanging eaves, and the penetration of interior and exterior. However, this ‘lightness’ was later criticized by Zhou Enlai, for its resemblance to tropical architecture and its seemingly instable appearance.18 This ‘mistake’ was corrected in the design of the Beijing Hotel East which had a much thicker eaves and more solemn façade and with more elaboration of ‘national form’, thus demonstrating increasing emphasis on Chinese identity. (Fig. 6) It seemed that the older generation of architects and Premier Zhou Enlai preferred the aesthetics of traditional Chinese architecture to modernism. ‘Chineseness’ was something much valued by the pragmatist leaders and often associated with Chinese tradition. But it was not a primary focus of leftist leaders who were strongly opposed to elaborate traditional decoration.

**Guangzhou**

Guangzhou is the most important window for foreign trade in the Mao era, hosting the Canton Trade Fair (C.T.F.) since 1957, which accounted for almost one third of the total amount of foreign trade in China after the C.T.F. was enlarged in the early 1970s. Due to the C.T.F., Guangzhou’s urban construction enjoyed much privileged support from the central government. In 1971, Lin Xi, who was in charge of Guangzhou’s urban construction work from 1956-66, was officially appointed by Zhou Enlai to organize the ‘Guangzhou Foreign Trade Projects’, including the new exhibition hall of the C.T.F. (1974), Guangzhou Railway Station (1974), Dongfang Hotel (1971-3), Baiyun Hotel (1972-6) and other buildings.19 (Fig. 7)

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17. *High Mountain and Flowing Water*, a mural painting by Dong Shouping in the east entrance. Source: courtesy of BIAD.

18. Beijing Hotel East. Source: courtesy of BIAD.

Compared to the Beijing architecture, ‘national form’ was not explicitly emphasized and Guangzhou architecture was closer to Western modernism, including both prewar and postwar modernism. Climate is an important account for this difference, as Wu has observed. In fact, a local tradition of modernism actively responding to the sub-tropical climate had been developed since the 1950s. Apart from this, Guangzhou as a provincial city was less burdened with the political requirement of national identity as seen in Beijing though it was carried out in a more subtle and implicit way. Moreover, closeness to Hong Kong provided Guangzhou architects easier access to Western knowledge through legal or illegal channels. The architectural library of South China University of Technology in Guangzhou had more English books than other university libraries in China at the time and many illegal copies of English books and magazines were popular amongst architects. A supportive local political leader was also crucial. Lin Xi, a fan of architecture and art, greatly supported architects in buying foreign books and arranged for them to experience a foreign ocean liner for the design of Baiyun Hotel when a field trip abroad was not possible.

Generally, from 1972 to 1974, Chinese architecture was more exposed to foreign visitors than periods before or after, because during these years, the pragmatist faction held relatively the upper hand. Immediately after Nixon’s visit, in 1972, a group of American-Chinese scholars was invited to China to give lectures, including an architecture professor, Joseph Lee from the University of Michigan. In April 1974, a delegation of American architects including Bill Slayton, A.I.A. Vice President and famous architect leoh Ming Pei, came to investigate various aspects of China from everyday life to architectural design. In the eyes of the foreign visitors, Guangzhou architecture was the “newest”, which was different from the Soviet-influenced architecture but similar to Western contemporary architecture. Dongfang Hotel, as the only hotel where Western foreigners stayed during C.T.F. sessions, was the most illustrated example in foreign reports. It was designed by She Junnan, the chief architect of Guangzhou Design Institute, who was a determined supporter of modernism. Despite its similarity to American resort hotels of the 1950s, it was also a tribute to prewar modernism, with Le Corbusier’s five points of architecture, including pilotis, free plan, free façade, horizontal window, and roof garden, all purposely illustrated in the building’s final built form.

Baiyun Hotel, finished three years later, was designed in an equally modernist language but with more emphasis on Chinese national identity. In 1972, a group of top architects in China were sent to Hong Kong to investigate new hotels with the support of the pragmatist leaders, to prepare for the design of two new hotel projects, the Baiyun Hotel and Beijing Hotel East. Among the new hotels built in the 1960s, Hilton Hong Kong, the first five-star hotel in Hong Kong, served as the primary precedent to study for the Chinese architects. The ‘separation’ of the decorative elements with local character from the modern structure inspired the Chinese architects to adopt the same strategy in applying simplified and abstracted traditional patterns attached to the modern structure in the interior design of the Baiyun Hotel. Apart from the interior decoration, the Chinese aesthetics and the garden-making spatial strategies were further incorporated into the modern structure, which was evident at various levels, from the arrangement of the courtyards, the spatial sequence and axes, to the interior spaces. (Fig. 8)

Compared to the International Club, which used simplified ‘national form’ and classical façade composition to explicitly express national identity in modern architecture, the Baiyun Hotel interpreted architectural language in a more subtle and creative way as seen both in the decorative elements at superficial level, referencing American hotel design, and

FIGURE 8 Section perspective drawn by Lin Zhaozhang. Source: Lin Zhaozhang, Lin Zhaozhang Jianzhu Chuangzuo Shougao (Lin Zhaozhang’s Architectural Drawings) (Guoji Wenhua Chubanshe, 1997), 12-3.
in the spatial organization at a deep level, referring back to garden-making traditions. Here, both indigenous and foreign knowledge were employed to serve the political needs of representing Chinese national identity in the modern building, and the two sources of knowledge were mutually supported. The separation of the traditional decoration and modern structure made the revival of traditional spatial tactics possible, because modernism provided a more flexible framework, allowing greater freedom in formal and spatial composition than the Beaux-Arts tradition on which the National Style was based.

Despite the positive comments of the foreign visitors, and the support from Zhou Enlai at the top level and Lin Xi at the local level, many officials and architects still strongly criticized the new architecture in Guangzhou, by associating the architectural form with negative political implications. For example, the horizontal lines adopted widely in Guangzhou architecture were said to be “capitalist”, in opposition to the vertical lines more typical of Soviet-influenced architecture which was seen as “socialist”, and the gardens and pools were criticized as “feudalism” to revoke the degenerated pleasure of the feudal emperors.\(^2\) But the architects managed to justify the formal characteristics from a functionalist and scientific perspective: the continuous horizontal eaves were to keep off the rain because of the poor insulation of the windows, as well as to facilitate the repairing and cleaning of the walls, and the gardens and pools were needed for fire evacuation.\(^2\) In these interstices of political struggles, modernism still thrived in Guangzhou in the 1970s.

**Conclusion**

In the two cases discussed above, one can see the ever-increasing emphasis on the political projection of Chinese identity in the key buildings, along with an increasing communication with the West and more access to Western knowledge from 1969 to 1976. Such representation was achieved in different ways: the Beijing architecture seems explicit albeit more modest compared to the 1950s; but Guangzhou architecture was more implicit and abstract. The gradually increasing communication with the contemporary West through both state-level official channels in Beijing and local-level legal or illegal channels in Guangzhou was crucial, despite the ongoing Leftist ideology being hostile to the West. The knowledge of Western modernism was the key to refreshing design strategies from the explicit use of ‘national form’ to more modern and integrated forms. Reference to the West inspired Chinese architects to creatively revive and re-interpret Chinese architectural traditions to represent ‘Chineseness’ in a modernist approach, which was exemplified by the International Club and the Baiyun Hotel. There, architectural form, the political aim of projecting Chinese national identity, and knowledge of Western modernism and Chinese tradition were inter-connected.

Within the triangulation of form, politics and knowledge, a certain historical wisdom related to the role of architects and the strategy of design should be acknowledged. The design strategy, consciously and sensitively responsive to political requirements and adaptive to various sources of architectural knowledge, was the mediator in this triangular relation. (Fig. 9)

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**FIGURE 9** Triangular relation of form, politics and knowledge, and the architects’ “adaptive strategy.”

Source: Drawn by the author.
Such responsive and adaptive design strategies had multi-faceted demonstrations in the late-Mao era, penetrating into the realms of form, politics and knowledge. First, in the rigid and sometimes harsh political environment, Chinese architects engagingly responded to political requirements, by working closely with supportive political leaders. The connection between architects and political leaders was not single-directional or imperative, but mutually educational, and cooperative. In the case of Guangzhou, such cooperation seemed more productive than elsewhere. Secondly, the architects could use an astute political sense to expediently justify specific designs to avoid political criticism from the opposite political faction. Thirdly, architects’ long-time interest and research into traditional Chinese architecture continued in the 1970s to inspire new approaches to representing national identity, and the practical experience in creating monumentality in previous times also continued. Fourthly, Western architectural knowledge was selectively and actively absorbed to develop new design approaches. Lastly, specific formal operations imbued inventiveness and originality into design, especially through small and subtle gestures and traditional spatial design skills.

As a general observation, the seven years of late-Mao era represents not only a climax of architectural modernism in China in terms of the historiography, but also a golden era for the architects who had the responsibility to engage with the political agenda, the curiosity to explore unknown knowledge, and the opportunity to deploy dexterity in formal composition and operation.

Endnotes


2 The most important research works on the architectural history of Mao’s China include: Zou Denong, Zhongguo Xiandai Jianzhu Shi (a History of Modern Chinese Architecture) (Tianjin: Tianjin Kexue Jishu Chubanshe, 2001); Peter G. Rowe, and Seng Kuan, Architectural Encounters with Essence and Form in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002); and Jianfei Zhu, Architecture of Modern China: A Historical Critique (London: Routledge, 2009).

3 It was developed from either the American Beaux-Arts tradition (1930s) or Soviet Socialist Realism (1950s).

4 Most importantly, traditionalism was revived in the discourse of post-modernism in the early 1980s, and is exemplified by the Beijing Fragrance Hill Hotel (1983), designed by I. M. Pei.


7 ‘High, big, exotic and old” refers to the design with its high standard, big scale, exotic form, and old style. See Zou Denong, Zhongguo Xiandai Jianzhu Shi (a History of Modern Chinese Architecture) (Tianjin: Tianjin Kexue Jishu Chubanshe, 2001), 291-300.

8 Both the leftist and the pragmatist factions agreed with this slogan but the meaning of it changed through time. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, this slogan was promoted by the radicals to emphasize the importance of revolution. But after 1969, this slogan was used to emphasize the balance between revolution and production. See Wang Xiangqing, and Hu Dan, “Zhuo Geming, Cu Shengchan” Minti De Lailong Qumai Kao: Yi Renmin Ribao De Xiangqun Baiadai Wei Yij i (“Grabsp Revolution, Promote Production”: The Discourse of Renmin Ribao),” Dangshi Yanjie yu Jiaoxue (Party History Research and Teaching), no. 03 (2016): 74-80.

9 Into the 1970s, China’s foreign policy no longer emphasized the export of revolution to other countries but the slogan of ‘Mao’s revolutionary line of foreign policy’ was continued.

10 Communications with Western countries were often supported by the pragmatist faction, led by Zhou Enlai, and criticized by the Leftist faction led by Jiang Qing.

11 The Technical Information Institute (T.I.I.) was a special department in the Ministry of Construction responsible for systematically collecting, selecting and translating foreign architectural information before distributing to other lower

12 ‘Three combinations’ was widely used as a slogan in the Design Revolution to denote different scenarios in which the intellectuals (such as architects) were required to work with and learn from the non-intellectuals including workers, users, carders and the radicals. Zou Denong, Zhongguo Xiandai Jianzhu Shi (a History of Modern Chinese Architecture) (Tianjin: Tianjin Kexue Jishu Chubanshe, 2001), 291-300.

13 Interview with Wu Guanzhang, 8 January 2015.

15 Wu had a rich knowledge of Chinese traditional architecture. He was born in Suzhou where he experienced its rich collection of private gardens. He trained under Liang Sicheng at Tsinghua University, where he learnt about traditional palatial architecture.


17 These art works were criticized by the Leftist faction as ‘black art’ and ‘hotel art’ for its lack of revolutionary spirit and nostalgia for ‘feudalism’. But the ‘national form’ of the buildings escaped such criticism.


20 Interview with Wu Guanzhang on 8 January 2015.

22 Cai Dedao, "Wo Jiyi Zhong De Lin Xi Yinxiang (Lin Xi in My Memory)," Guangzhou Wenshi (Guangzhou History), no. 3 (2000): 60-1.

23 During this period, foreign affairs and economic development were pushed forward smoothly without much intervention from the Leftists. But after 1974, closer to the death of Mao, the political struggle between the pragmatists and the Leftists was more intense.

25 Thompson, "The New China".

