

ULTRA

Positions and Polarities Beyond Crisis

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Foreign Aid and Modern Architecture in Indonesia: Intersecting Cold War Relations and Funding for the Fourth Asian Games, 1962

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Keywords

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Foreign Aid

Abstract

Between 1950 and 1965, foreign aid played a crucial role within the Indonesian economy. With the Cold War as a backdrop, this aid came from both Western and Eastern blocs with the intention of drawing Indonesia into their spheres of influence. The aid also played a crucial role in the development of architecture in the archipelago. A major endeavour within this period was the construction of buildings and venues for the Fourth Asian Games to be held in Jakarta in 1962 which involved a new stadium, an international-standard hotel and a large by-pass road around part of the city. Financial and technical aid from the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States was obtained to realise these projects. All the while, the Asian Games, along with the modern structures constructed for the event, provided Indonesia an opportunity to advance its own agenda, which was to construct a sense of self-confidence and national pride and to situate itself as a leader among decolonised nations. Nevertheless, foreign financial and technical aid played an important role in the realisation of these projects. The availability of foreign aid was intrinsically tied to President Ahmad Sukarno's ability to play the interests of all sides.

This paper examines plans and preparations for the Fourth Asian Games as a case of engagement between the two Cold War blocs with Indonesia in the middle. By focusing on the key building projects for the Games, the paper reveals the role of foreign aid in the development of architecture in Indonesia during a critical period in its post-war and post-independence formation. This development took place through the interaction of different interests—those of the Western Bloc, the Eastern Bloc, and Indonesia—in the midst of the Cold War and decolonisation period. A glimpse into the interaction may suggest a case of competition. However, examination of the three projects indicates that it was a case of multipolar collaboration instead.

Introduction

1. Victor Cha, "The Asian Games and Diplomacy in Asia: Korea –China –Russia," *International Journal of the History of Sport* 30, no. 10 (2013): 1176-1187.


2. Robin Hartanto, "The Shapes of Sport Diplomacy: Gelora Bung Karno, Jakarta, and the Fourth Asian Games," *Modern Living in Southeast Asia*, the 4th mASEANa Conference, Jakarta, January 18-20, 2018, 26.

3. G.W. Holliday, foreword for *Asian Games 4, Djakarta 1962: a Souvenir Booklet* (Djakarta: Shell, 1962), 10.

The setting of this paper is Jakarta, where the Asian Games IV was held in August 1962. The Games, which had previously been hosted in New Delhi (1951), Manila (1954), and Tokyo (1958), was more than a sporting event. Victor Cha, a historian, notes that the Asian Games provided a symbolic value which, to Asian countries, acted as a tool necessary for diplomacy.¹ The diplomatic opportunity for Indonesia however was marred by controversy, as Israeli and Taiwanese contingents were excluded due to pressure from Beijing and Arab countries. Beijing considered Taiwan as a breakaway territory, while Arab countries did not recognise the sovereignty of Israel.

The opening ceremony of the Fourth Asian Games was held at the main stadium at the newly-built Sports Venue. With its contemporary design and monumental scale, the Sport Venue itself expressed in concrete form the desire to project an international image for Indonesia as a nation growing in strength and confidence.²

The Sports Venue was built in the midst of the Cold War with financial and technical aid from the Soviet Union. However, this does not mean that Indonesia was on the same side as the Soviet Union. This is evident in the official booklet issued for the Games, which contained programmes, a map of the Sport Venue and tourist information on Jakarta and Bali. The booklet was published by the Anglo-Dutch oil company, Shell. In his foreword, Chairman of the Board of Shell Indonesia, G. W. Holliday, wrote that the company he represented was "an ardent believer in international understanding and cooperation" and hoped that the booklet would "help to acquaint the visitors with the country."³



The official booklet for the Asian Games IV, 1962.
Source: National Library of Australia

The Sports Venue was not the only structure erected for the Games. Other projects were the Athletes' Village, The Press House, Hotel Indonesia, the broadening of Thamrin-Sudirman Streets and the construction of the Djakarta Bypass Road. This paper focuses on three of these projects—the Sports Venue, Hotel Indonesia and the Djakarta Bypass Road—as these projects were made possible by foreign financial and technical aid.

While the Sports Venue was built with Soviet aid, Hotel Indonesia was built with Japanese aid and the Djakarta Bypass Road was constructed with the help of American aid. This latter project was important not only to regulate traffic during the Asian Games but also to implement a 1957 plan for Jakarta's eastward expansion.

This paper examines the role of foreign aid in the development of modern architecture in post-independence Indonesia by focusing on the three construction projects related to the Asian Games. It reveals how the encounter between the interests of Indonesia and countries within the Eastern Bloc and Western Bloc helped develop the architecture of the young nation. It proposes that this encounter can be considered as one of multipolar collaboration.

Foreign Aid for Indonesia

4. Thee Kian Wee, *Indonesia's Economy since Independence* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 38-62.

5. By 1951 the Indonesian economy was still dominated by several Dutch companies. Through the policy, the Indonesian government wanted to put the economy under Indonesian control. See Thee Kian Wee, "Sumitro Djohadikusumo," in *Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s – 1990s*, ed. Thee Kian Wee (Singapore and Canberra: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 2003), 59.

6. Ministry of Economic Affairs, *Urgency Industrialization Program* (Jakarta, Ministry of Economic Affairs, March 1951), 19. See also John O. Sutter, "Indonesianisasi: Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940-1955," Vol. III, Data Paper no. 36-III (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, April 1959), 773.

7. Ministry of Economic Affairs, *Urgency Industrialization Program*, 20. See also John O. Sutter, "Indonesianisasi: Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940-1955," 776.

8. Archive of the Republic of Indonesia, Dewan Asian Games Indonesia, Biro III Lapangan/Bangunan, Laporan ke-12, (Jakarta: July 6, 1960), Sekretariat Negara 1945 – 1973, Archive no. 1715.

Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945, while the transfer of sovereignty took place in December 1949. Although some nationalist leaders saw capitalism as closely related to colonialism, Indonesia did not adopt a socialist economic system. Thee Kian Wee, a historian of economics, discusses two different views on economics in post-independence Indonesia: some wanted to have the country's entire economic activity within Indonesian hands, while others tolerated the presence of some foreign ownership.⁴ However, neither of the two sides had problems with private enterprises, which were present in Indonesia. The more important issue for both sides was the dire economic condition of the country. This prompted the government to formulate an economic policy in 1951, the main intention of which was the 'Indonesianisation' of the economic sector, as Indonesia's economy was still dominated by foreign interests. Nonetheless, the policy was not completely against foreign involvement in the economy, as foreign investment was also sought.⁵ Industrialisation was a prominent part of the policy which identified certain industries considered to be strategically important to the Indonesian state and which therefore needed to be placed under State ownership and management.⁶

Industries considered as strategic included cement production which involved the creation of a new cement plant in Gresik, East Java.⁷ Evidence suggests that the Gresik cement plant had an important role in the supply of cement for the construction of a number of important buildings commissioned by Sukarno's government. A progress report on the construction of the Sports Venue by the Board of Asian Games Indonesia tells of the use of cement from the Gresik plant (supplemented with Soviet cement) for the project.⁸ Cement from Gresik may also have been used for Hotel Indonesia and the Jakarta Bypass Road.

Economic conditions in Indonesia meant that there was not enough money and expertise to establish the industries planned within the 1951 economic policy. Foreign aid was necessary. While Indonesia was looking for foreign aid to assist its economic recovery, it found itself in the middle of the Cold War. By hosting the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955, Indonesia established its position as neutral country. This position was reinforced in 1961 as Indonesia became a co-founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, along with Yugoslavia, India, Egypt and Ghana. The involvement of Indonesia in the Afro-Asian Conference and the establishment of Non-Aligned Movement reinforced its position of neutrality.

9. Regarding Soviet interest on Indonesia during the Cold War, see Larisa M. Efimova, "Stalin and the Revival of the Communist Party of Indonesia," *Cold War History* 5, no. 1 (2005): 107-120, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1468274042000283162>. As for the United States' interest on Indonesia, see "Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys," presented by Senator Theodore Francis Green, *The Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program* (Washington, United States Senate, July 1957), 1461-1464. This report started with the premise that economic aid was intended to keep away countries from Soviet sphere of influence, *ibid.*, 6-8.

10. Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 146.

11. For Indian case, see David C. Engerman, *The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018), 1-11. On Ethiopian case, see Ayala Levin, "Haile Selassie's Imperial Modernity," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 75, no. 4, (Dec. 2016), 447-468.

12. Donald Hindley, "Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implications," *Pacific Affairs* 36, no. 2 (1963), 109.

13. "Tiga Persetujuan Bersama RI-URSS Ditandatangani di Bogor, Kredit Baru 250,000,000 Dollar," *Harian Rakjat*, February 29, 1960, 1.

14. See Law Number 35, Year 1954 on *Endorsement of the Additional Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Export-Import Bank of Washington* (Jakarta, Republic of Indonesia, December 3, 1954). See also "New Growth at Gresik Cement Plant," *The Em-Kayan: Magazine of M-K* (Boise: Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., December 1961), 6.

15. The site clearance for the Sports Venue involved moving local inhabitants to another part of southern Jakarta. The activity of moving the locals was reported in "Bantuan Angkatan Darat dalam Rangka Pembangunan Proyek Asian Games IV yang merupakan Proyek Nasional yang Sangat Vital," *Madjalah Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat SA-12* (Bandung: Pusat Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, 1962), 7-8.

16. Ragna Boden, "Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10, no. 3 (2008), 115. See also Łukasz Stanek, *Architecture in Global Socialism: Eastern Europe, West Africa, and the Middle East in the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), 8-11.

17. Donald Hindley, "Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implications," 111.

Nevertheless, Indonesia was a contested country. Both Moscow and Washington wanted to pull Indonesia into their sphere of influence.⁹ Foreign aid given to Indonesia was considered a means to build relations and exercise this influence. In this situation, as historian Taomo Zhou has noted, Indonesia chose to mimic Yugoslavia: by playing the competition between the two blocs in order to gain the most for its own interests.¹⁰ India and Ethiopia also did the same.¹¹

Between 1950 and 1961, Indonesia received USD 544.9 million in aid from the United States.¹² In 1960 the Soviet Union made available USD 250 million of aid to Indonesia.¹³ When it came to the industrialisation effort, the Gresik cement plant was realised due to the availability of American financial and technical aid.¹⁴

Indonesia did not only use foreign aid for industrialisation purposes. It was also deployed for the architectural and infrastructural development. While Indonesia asked Moscow to help realise the Sport Venue, it also requested Tokyo to help build Hotel Indonesia and Washington for the construction of the Djakarta Bypass Road. This would suggest Indonesia played the competition between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Blocs. Without dismissing the existence of competition, limiting the study to only a matter of competition would prevent a more comprehensive understanding of the role of foreign aid in the development of modern architecture in post-war Indonesia. Foreign aid can also be considered as a conduit for collaboration.

The Sports Venue

When Jakarta was chosen in May 1958 to host the Asian Games in 1962 existing sporting facilities within the city were deemed to be below Olympic standard. A new sports venue was needed. It was decided to construct this venue within the Senayan District in southern Jakarta. The district was chosen as it still had a sufficient area for such a complex, and it was close to the southern end of Sudirman Street, a part of the Thamrin-Sudirman axis which formed Jakarta's main thoroughfare.¹⁵ Due to the lack of financial resources and expertise, Indonesia needed foreign assistance in its endeavour to build a modern sports venue, which would not only consist of a large stadium but also other buildings and facilities.

Planning for the Sports Venue coincided with Moscow's attempt to replace the United States as Indonesia's main foreign donor by offering aid to Indonesia to the amount of USD 250 million. Moscow wanted the aid to be used for more practical purposes, such as building infrastructure and new industries. However, Sukarno managed to persuade Nikita Khrushchev to provide financial and technical aid for the construction of the Sports Venue in spite of Khrushchev's initial reluctance.¹⁶ After Khrushchev agreed to this, Moscow provided financial aid of USD 12.5 million plus technical aid for the Sport Venue.¹⁷

Soviet technical aid came in the form of the involvement of Technoexport, a team of Soviet architects and engineers. On 12 October 1959, two Soviet experts arrived in Jakarta to assist with the planning of the Sport Venue. They were R. I. Semerdjiev, who became

18. "Bantuan Angkatan Darat dalam Rangka Pembangunan Proyek Asian Games IV yang merupakan Proyek Nasional yang Sangat Vital," 9.

19. "Bantuan Angkatan Darat dalam Rangka Pembangunan Proyek Asian Games IV yang merupakan Proyek Nasional yang Sangat Vital," 46-52.

20. A newspaper report mentioned the names of engineers who were pivotal in completing the Sports Venue's main stadium. They were Soviet engineers, Tyattenko, Karanian, Spirin and Cholodiev, as well as Indonesian engineers, Wartaman, Dendeng, Muljadi, Suhartojo, Wonargo, Suroso and others. See "Introducing the Sports Venue," *Harian Rakjat*, Saturday, August 25, 1962, 2.

21. Archive of the Republic of Indonesia, Komando Urusan Pembangunan Asian Games, Surat tentang Pengiriman Prof. Ir. Roosseno ke Moskow, (Djakarta, February 1, 1961), Sekretariat Negara, 1945 – 1973, Archive no. 1867.

the project's chief architect, and L. A. Moromtsev, a senior engineer.¹⁸ Semerdjiev and Moromtsev worked on the Sports Venue with other Soviet experts connected to Technoexport. Not only did the Soviets provide money and expertise for the construction of the Sports Venue, they also sent steel, glass and electrical pipes, as well as welding equipment.¹⁹ The Soviet Union also sent cement to augment supply from the Gresik plant. In addition to Soviet experts, some Indonesians with expertise were also involved in the project.²⁰ One of these was the technical advisor to the Board of Asian Games Indonesia, Roosseno Surjodihadikusumo.²¹




Sukarno (pointing his finger), Semerdjiev (in dark suit) and the model of the Sports Venue (left), and the Sports Venue's main stadium under construction (right).
Source: *Asian Games 4, Djakarta 1962: a Souvenir Booklet* (Djakarta: Shell, 1962), 12-13.

22. *IVth Asian Games Bulletin: Progress Report Covering Plans and Preparations for the IVth Asian Games* (Djakarta: The Organizing Committee IVth Asian Games, 1960), 3-4.

Construction of the Sports Venue took place between 1960 and 1962 and consisted of several of buildings that would house different sporting events. The main building was the Main Stadium with an all-covered seating capacity for up to 100,000 people. Other buildings included the Sports Hall (where badminton and basketball matches would be held) with a 10,000 seating capacity, the Swimming Stadium, also with a 10,000 seating capacity, Tennis Stadium with a 5,000 seating capacity, Athletics and Hockey Stadium with a 20,000 seating capacity, an open air Volleyball Court, and a shooting range. Events, such as sailing, would also be held at other venues.²²

23. Ahmad Sukarno, "Speech at the Presidential Palace on September 2, 1966," (Djakarta: Secretariat of State, Republic of Indonesia, 1966), 16.

Buildings at the Sports Venue were made of concrete. The roofs of the Main Stadium and the Sports Hall were of steel construction and their foundations and walls were concrete. Concrete and steel, materials associated with modern architecture, were preferred by Sukarno. In one of his speeches pertaining to another monumental building (the Istiqlal Mosque), Sukarno mentioned concrete and steel as materials that could represent the desired free and modern Indonesian image.²³



Photographs of the inauguration of the Sports Venue's main stadium by Sukarno and Soviet Deputy Premier, Anastas Mikoyan.

Source: *The Indonesian Herald*, July 23, 1962, 1.

Hotel Indonesia

24. *Japan Report* 7, no. 5 (New York: Japan Information Center, Consulate General of Japan, March 25, 1961), 5.

25. Masashi Nishihara, *The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951-1966* (Kyoto: The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 1976), 87.

26. Masashi Nishihara, *The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951-1966*, 104.

27. *Japan Report* 7, No. 5, 5.

28. Hilton Hotel in Istanbul was designed by Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM) and financed by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) which administered the Marshall Plan. See Annabel Jane Wharton, *Building the Cold War: Hilton International Hotels and Modern Architecture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 29-34, 37.

29. Archive of the Republic of Indonesia, Bank Industri Negara, Development Loan Fund Application: Revised Proposal for Hotel Indonesia Djakarta Projects (Djakarta, June 19, 1959), Sekretariat Negara KPM, 1950 - 1959 Vol. II, Archive no. 1450.

As Indonesia lacked the financial resources to fund the construction of a large international standard hotel, capital for the hotel's construction came in the form of a Japanese loan of USD 8 million.²⁴ This loan was attached to the war reparation payment from Japan to Indonesia.²⁵ An Indonesian state-owned construction company, the PN. Pembangunan Perumahan (PN. PP), acted as the main contractor for the project. The Japanese loan seems to have a condition attached to it: that Japanese companies be involved in the construction of the hotel. These companies were Kinoshita, Taisei Construction and Tonichi.²⁶ Their involvement was to provide expertise. Taisei also provided building materials and equipment unavailable in Indonesia at that time.²⁷ A New York-based, Danish-American architect couple, Abel and Wendy Sorensen, were commissioned to design the hotel and Julius Berger, a West German engineer, worked on the structural, electrical and mechanical engineering. Berger had previously been involved in the Hilton Hotel project in Istanbul.²⁸ An Indonesian expert on concrete, Rooseno Surjodihadikusumo, was also hired as a consultant for the project.²⁹



Hotel Indonesia in 1962, when it was almost completed. Source: Archive of the Republic of Indonesia, Department of Information, Archive no. 62-3508.

30. "President Inspects Progress of Hotel Indonesia," *The Indonesian Herald*, February 16, 1962, 1.

31. "Personnel of Hotel Indonesia," *The Indonesian Herald*, December 16, 1961, 2.


32. "President Sukarno to Inaugurate Hotel Indonesia August 5," *The Indonesian Herald*, June 9, 1962, 1.

Hotel Indonesia was intended to portray independent Indonesia's modern and optimistic image. Its role in image projection was so important that President Sukarno himself inspected the construction progress of the hotel, and took special notice of the hotel's restaurant hall and the interior of its rooms.³⁰ Not only were its modernist architectural features to project an image of optimism, the hotel was also to provide international standard services. In order to ensure such standards were achieved, hotel staff were sent to Hong Kong and the United States for training.³¹ Furthermore, Hotel Indonesia was administered by an American manager affiliated with the Intercontinental Hotel Corporation (a sister company of the Pan American Airways company) who had previously handled Hotel Nacional in Havana.³²

33. The original phrase is "*Het is het grootste en modernste hotel van Zuid-Oost-Azië.*" Photo caption, *Leeuwarder Courant* (September 16, 1962), 17.

34. "Indonesia Woos the Tourists," *The Canberra Times*, August 20, 1962, 12.

A Dutch newspaper described the 14-storey Hotel Indonesia as "the largest and the most modern hotel in South East Asia."³³ An Australian newspaper reported that the hotel featured a hall, named the Ramayana Hall—after the ancient Ramayana epic—with its hyperbolic concrete roof. In addition to its 420 air-conditioned rooms, the hotel boasted five restaurants, a club, a shopping arcade and swimming pool.³⁴



Sukarno (in pith hat) inspecting a maquette of Hotel Indonesia with Abel Sorensen (standing on the right). Source: *Times of Indonesia* (August 27, 1960), 1.

The Bypass Road

35. *Third Progress Report* (Djakarta: The Organizing Committee for the IVth Asian Games, April 1962), 7.

36. *Third Progress Report to the Members of the Council of the Asian Games Federation by the Organizing Committee for the IVth Asian Games Djakarta 1962* (Djakarta: The Organizing Committee IVth Asian Games, 1962), 7.

37. Kenneth Watts, "Urban Planning and Development, 1948 – 1989: a Personal Memoir," *Habitat International* 16, no. 2 (1992), 13-35.

38. Kenneth Watts, "The Planning of Greater Djakarta: a Case Study of Regional Planning," *Ekistics* 10, no. 62 (December 1960), 402. See also, Robert W. Oliver, "Greater Djakarta, the Capital City of Indonesia," Economic Staff Working Paper No. 105, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association (April 21, 1971), 25-26.

39. Kemas Ridwan Kurniawan, Christopher Silver, M. Nanda Widyarta and Elita Nuraeny. "Pulo Mas: Jakarta's Failed Housing Experiment for the Masses," *Planning Perspectives* 36, no.2 (2021), 285-308.

40. "Rapid Work Opens Djakarta Bypass," *The Em-Kayan: Magazine of M-K* (Boise: Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., September 1962), 6-8.

41. "Rapid Work Opens Djakarta Bypass," 6.

42. On the role of Morrison-Knudsen International in international projects financed by Washington during the Cold War era, see James David Durand, *Building the Modern World: Morrison-Knudsen Construction Company*, MA thesis submitted to Boise State University (December 2013).


Another project pertaining to the Fourth Asian Games was the 7.9 kilometre-long Djakarta Bypass Road.³⁵ This was not an architectural project, rather a major piece of city infrastructure. The aim was to enable alternative traffic access to and from the Tanjung Priok Seaport. This would serve to divert trucks from the main roads of Jakarta and therefore ease traffic while preventing congestion during the Asian Games.³⁶

The Djakarta Outline Plan had been issued in 1957 and was part of a United Nations-backed project to develop a city plan for Jakarta involving the British city planner Kenneth Watts who had been involved in the Master Plan for Singapore from 1952 to 1955.³⁷ The 1957 plan prescribed an eastward expansion for Jakarta through the construction of new roads.³⁸ The Djakarta Bypass Road would act as a trigger for this expansion as the road would provide traffic access east of the city. The construction of the road would also support the United Nations-sponsored and Danish-planned housing area at Pulo Mas. This project was intended to supply housing for Jakarta's middle-lower class who needed better dwellings.³⁹ Although the Djakarta Bypass Road also pertained to the Djakarta Outline Plan, it was instigated in the early 1960s due to the Asian Games.


The bypass road was a big project made possible by American financial aid provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).⁴⁰ In addition, two American companies were also involved in its construction: the Morrison-Knudsen International and Bechtel International.⁴¹ Morrison-Knudsen International was a company involved in various American-assisted construction projects globally during the Cold War.⁴² More than USD 3 million worth of construction materials and

43. "Rapid Work Opens Djakarta Bypass," 9. See also "Bypass Cuts Djakarta Traffic Clog," *The Em-Kayan: Magazine of M-K* (Boise: Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., October 1963), 9.

equipment were brought in from the United States, while around 2,200 Indonesian workers toiled 24 hours a day and seven days a week under the supervision of the Americans.⁴³



Construction of the Djakarta Bypass Road. Source: *The Em-Kayan: Magazine of "M.K."* (Boise: Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., October 1963) 9.



A small part of the Djakarta Bypass Road. Source: *The Em-Kayan: Magazine of "M.K."* (Boise: Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., October 1963) 8.

Conclusion

44. "Minister Prijono on Hotel Indonesia and Asian Games Complex," *The Indonesian Herald*, July 20, 1962, 1.

Commenting on the buildings conceived for the Asian Games IV, particularly Hotel Indonesia and the Sports Venue, the Minister of Basic Education and Culture, Dr. Prijono (who went by one name) said "[i]t is hoped that our modern culture in the widest sense of term would also have the postulates of a modern culture as defined by Sigmund Freud, namely orderliness, cleanliness and beauty."⁴⁴ Prijono, like Sukarno, saw the modern structures of the Asian Games as a means to modernise the Indonesian society.

The three construction projects studied here can be seen as examples of how the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc competed to win influence over Indonesia. However, while such competition should not be dismissed, the projects suggest a multipolar collaborative effort

45. The British planner, Kenneth Watts, mentioned the roles of Indonesian planning experts working with him when conceiving plan for Jakarta. He mentioned by names Danunagoro (Jakarta's Director of Public Works), Handinoto (an expert on housing), and Soefaat. See "Urban Planning and Development, 1948 – 1989: a Personal Memoir," 16-17.

instead of a competition. In fact, the involvements of both the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc in the preparation of the Games meant that Indonesia did not have to take side. At a glance, the Sports Venue seems to be a solely Soviet endeavour. However, its construction utilised cement supplied by an Indonesian plant which had been established by American financial and technical aid. Financed with a Japanese loan, Hotel Indonesia involved not only Japanese companies but also New York-based architects and West German and American engineering consultants. The Djakarta Bypass Road was made possible by American financial and technical aid with the involvement of two American companies. Nevertheless, the road was not merely an American project. Before Jakarta was even selected to host the Asian Games, the road had been conceived by a British planner who worked under a contract with the United Nations, which provided aid to Indonesia for the planning of the city.⁴⁵ While foreign involvement was prominent in all three projects, Indonesians were also involved. Indonesian experts contributed to the Sports Venue and Hotel Indonesia projects. The structural engineer, Roosseno Surjodihadikusumo—a friend of Sukarno since their college years in 1920s—was present in both the Sports Venue and Hotel Indonesia projects. An Indonesian construction company was also involved in the construction of the hotel.

This collaboration involved not only financial aid and experts. Private and state-owned companies—both foreign and Indonesian—took part. The involvement of foreign entities such as Technoexport and the Morrison-Knudsen International and Bechtel International companies indicates that it was not only technical expertise but also the networks of knowledge and discourse they would have brought to the projects and to Indonesia more generally. More research is necessary to discover more about these networks; what they consisted of and the role they played in supporting the endeavours of Sukarno, his government and local enterprise in building modern Indonesia.

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