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Towards an Architectural History of Homelessness
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Joseph Rykwert’s Adam’s House in Paradise examines the conceptual origins of architecture, which indeed might also be the origins of architectural history. But what happens when there is no primitive hut? What happens to architectural history when there is no home?

This paper considers Banham’s critique of the architectural profession and of architectural history and Leach’s proposal of interior and exterior histories. It considers the definition of homelessness as interdependent on definitions of home, which locate architecture as partial, compromised or absent. It presents Hodgetts et al.’s specific case study of Brett, a homeless man in Auckland, contextualised by international research on homelessness with the aim of providing a model of architecture based on notions of exclusion. The paper concludes by speculating on the potential of homelessness as evidence and problem for the construction of an architectural history.

This paper is the collision of related desires: an interest in the spatial complexity of homelessness and a query as to whether homelessness can be the subject of a discipline-specific architectural history. Homelessness clearly has a history. It is a word that changes in usage and a phenomenon whose nature varies with social and political context, and many historical techniques could be used to document these changes. Such a project could be underpinned by a desire to change the status quo of homelessness—as Tosh notes “Historical difference lies at the heart of the discipline’s claim to be socially relevant …. The point is not to find a precedent, but to be alert to possibilities. History is an inventory of alternatives.” But would this necessarily be an architectural history?

Leach, in his *What is Architectural History?*, is both categorically generous and disciplined in his proposition of “[i]nterior and exterior histories,” a concept he defines but does not elaborate fully. Interior history is established via the internalising of architectural evidence: “[w]hen a work of architecture is itself evidence for a non-architectural problem in history, as a document it internalizes the evidentiary field.” He draws disciplinary lines adroitly by stating that: “architectural works of all kinds can themselves become evidence for historical problems that are not architectural,” suggesting that the problem, rather than the evidence, “determines whether a history is architectural,” and that a valid architectural history will make explicit—externalise—its architectural evidence in the process of negotiating or engaging an architectural historical problem.

Before considering the parameters of an architectural historical problem, how is architecture, as “architectural history’s substance,” to be defined? A narrow definition of architecture resides proximate to the architect: what the architect designs, or the changing scope of building types deemed within the gamut of an architect’s practice. Banham suggests that “we could halt the vulgar cultural imperialism that leads the writers of general histories of architecture to co-opt absolutely everything upon the earth’s crust into their subject matter,” and advocates for “non-architectural objects” remaining non-architectural:

Let us then re-divorce what should never have been joined together in this opportunistic marriage-of-convenience. Throw out all the Zulu kraals, grain-elevators, hogans, lunar excursion modules, cruck-houses, Farman biplanes and so forth, and look again at “this thing called architecture” in its own right, as one of a number of thinkable modes of design which, for some reason, has come to occupy a position of cultural privilege in relation to the construction industry . . . . So why do we not admit that what distinguishes architecture is not what is done . . . but how it is done.11

Banham’s critique of architecture implicates architectural history’s political productivity through acknowledging architecture’s status as a cultural practice where method (how) defines architectural distinction. Banham’s how constitutes “the fundamental value-system on which architects operate,” which he concludes lies in “the exercise of an arcane and privileged aesthetic code,” the “persistence of drawing—disegno—as a kind of meta-pattern that subsumes all other patterns and shelters them from rational scrutiny . . . being unable to think without drawing became the true


3. Leach, *What is Architectural History?* See also Leach’s other reference to “internal” where architecture is “a trace of events and agendas that are not its own, but which nevertheless implicate its historical development.” Leach, *What is Architectural History?* 51.


7. Leach makes two connections to architectural history and architects: through the analogy of biography, and the notion of architecture as “evidence of the architect’s actions and intentions.” Leach, *What is Architectural History?* 53.

8. Pevsner’s comparison between a bicycle shed and Lincoln cathedral embodies an idea that some types of buildings are not architecture, and this coincides with the building types which are not designed by architects, which changes as the scope of buildings designed by architects changes. Leach also refers to typology as “regard[ing] architecture as analogous with any number of other phenomena, natural or cultural” (Leach, *What is Architectural History?* 62). Conway and Roehnisch’s reference to Bannister Fletcher’s comparative method as an application of “the techniques of comparative anatomy and comparative biology to architecture” is an example of this. Hazel Conway and Rowan Roehnisch, *Understanding Architecture: An Introduction to Architecture and Architectural History* (London; New York: Routledge, 1994): 34. It might perhaps also be argued that an architect’s practice was linked to the ability for a building to be co-opted into architectural categorisation of, for example, style given that some buildings (Pevsner’s bicycle sheds for instance) lie beyond categorisation as Gothic, Renaissance, Neo-classical or Edwardian etc.


12. Banham, “A Black Box.” Banham initially includes an architect’s assumption of responsibility for function, environmental performance, beauty, space design etc. but then excludes this as an attribute of notions of professionalism rather than “what makes them architects.” Banham, “A Black Box,” 23.

mark of one fully socialised into the profession of architecture,” suggesting the collapse of architectural thought into representation, underpinned by an evasive logic.

While the historicising of an architectural problem might produce an architectural history, architecture and history coincide with their dependencies on representation. History is to the past as disegno is to architecture. It is a substitute for a spatio-temporally past. This displacement is partially mended by historical desires to know, but history no longer has singular absolutism or authority. It is now revealed as fundamentally wayward with a potential for plurality, congenital subjectivity and a provisional nature. An architectural history for Banham must hence scrutinise a temporally-based understanding of architecture as privileged cultural practice and its mechanism for achieving this (disegno).

Within Banham’s rendering of architecture, an architectural problem might result from the maintenance, or definition of, or challenge to, professional distance and exclusivity; from the sidelining of designo as integral to architectural production. Parametric design might dislocate the cultural ritual of “being unable to think without drawing,” as we increasing become unable to operate without computers, while SketchUp seemingly makes everyone’s five year-old daughter a building designer. Drawing as “the exercise of an arcane and privileged aesthetic code” is no longer the boundary of professionalism it once maintained. The aftermath of Christchurch’s earthquake has demonstrated comprehensively that it is engineers—not architects—who are the guardians of the built environment. Jennian Homes and Mitre 10 Dream Home, rather than architectural institutes, inform the public about how to fulfil their architectural desires. Increasingly architecture is tested as to its relevance and centrality; its elitism approximating at times a socially marginal position articulated through the suppressive disciplines of silence and absence, rather than explicit statements of insignificance. In a world which privileges choice it might be that counter-histories, rather than histories, of architecture, more meaningfully prescribe the future of architects and their professionalisms.

Defining Homelessness

Homelessness is not “houselessness.” Home conjures notions of belonging, and so identity. Sixsmith, for example, states that “[t]he home can be seen as an extension of oneself” while Cooper draws on Jungian psychology to propose the house as a
“symbol of the self.” Home is atmospheric and socially-inflicted. Such a generously subjective core distinguishes this sense of architectural categorisation, which contrasts with the typological definition foregrounded by “house,” as: “building for human habitation, esp. a building that is the ordinary dwelling-place of a family.” Home transcends buildings, while house is firmly built. Home accompanies you when moving house, or transforms “a dwelling unit . . . into a home,” and “the childhood home . . . into the adult home.” It implicates familial relations with the built fabric of a house. It is the “interaction between place and social relationships,” and security through the reliability of routine and the mundane. Manzo refers to Seamon’s definition of “at-homeness” as “the usually unnoticed, taken-for-granted situation of being comfortable in, and familiar with, the everyday world in which one lives, and outside of which one is visiting,” while Mallett identifies “temporal processes . . . routinized activities as well as seasonal and/or cyclical events such as birthdays” as able to forge a notion of “being at home.”

Home is a relationship with place, where building is conveniently present, but not foregrounded. This is not to say that home only sustains pleasanties. For battered women, home comprises “both negative and positive meanings.” Mallett, following Goldsack, states that “[h]ome for these people is a site of fear and isolation, a prison, rather than a place of absolute freedom and ontological security.” Manzo, referring to families of divorce notes that “the residence is a source of stress as those who leave feel evicted, and those who remain feel ill at ease as they adjust to the changing meaning of the residence.”

Home, like any word, is also historically and culturally specific. Mallett refers to Rybczynski’s identification of the seventeenth-century as the moment when “privacy, domesticity, intimacy and comfort . . . as organizing principles for the design and use of domestic spaces” emerged; and the development of the idea of “house as haven” in both mid-eighteenth-century bourgeois British and French households and with the mid-nineteenth-century American middle-class. She also notes the increasing inclusion of housing tenure in definitions of home (resulting from “the re-structuring of economies and welfare states that has occurred in . . . [advanced capitalist countries] over the past two to three decades”), as having impacted on the meaning of home.

Exclusion is a recurring term, applied, beyond that of a physical boundary condition, to dominate the intangible spectrum of homelessness. To be homeless is not only to be houseless, but...
also to be excluded from basic social services and legal rights. To participate in society one requires a secure relationship to a domestic building, because to have a home is to also have an identity. From a pragmatic point of view to be without an abode is to be excluded from, for example, the mechanisms of census data collection, access to a public library card (which requires proof of address) and, ironically, to potentially be both excluded from homeless statistics, or to amplify them, because inclusion in the homeless count requires registration with a housing agency, and contact with several organisations might cause an individual to be counted more than once. The wonderfully evocative term: “concealed” homelessness, identifies those between statistics, and locates the misuse of built structures (overpasses, bus shelters and gun emplacements reappropriated as “homes”) as engaging a disguised architectural programme.

**An Architecture of Homelessness**

While definitions of homelessness rely on a mechanism of exclusion from (or perhaps exclusivity of) home, as if the ideas of home and homelessness can be simply and decisively delineated, many academics refute such an absolute distinction. In identifying a category of “homeless-at-home” Wardaugh can critique an “understanding of home as a “haven in a heartless world” as integral and causal to homelessness. She proposes that for many women (and marginal men) “there may be no clear binary divide between home and homelessness, between inside and outside, safety and danger, but rather a more individual and cyclical relation to each of these conditions.”

Hodgetts et al.’s study of a homeless man “Brett” in Auckland similarly indicates how “some form of at-homeness” and the actuality of homelessness can co-exist. They argue that mundane practices, use of objects (especially portable possessions) and mobility can be used as strategies to construct home through place-based identities. This observation is supported by Case’s identification of “home as routine” as one of two principal definitions of home derived from “the dialectical process of ‘being at home’ and ‘being away from home.’” These mechanisms used by Brett to produce domestic space, perhaps best described by Douglas’ observation that: “home starts by bringing some space under control,” included strategies to create: normalcy, new spatial conditions, spatial control and ownership — perhaps a form of intangible territorialism, and to distinguish private space...
through his use of: clothing and appearance, portable objects, a strategic occupation of space, and oblivion. These strategies echo those Datta observed in her study of an emergency shelter. While the physical context of homelessness differs, Datta concluded that “privacy, security, domesticity, and a certain degree of control over their physical environment was understood as home-like .... The homeless families actively appropriated spaces to redefine their identities through patterns of spatial behavior, consumption, lifestyles, and attire.”

Knowledge of social etiquette, how others’ assumptions can project or deny the space that you inhabit, how strategic occupation of space can refashion self, and how behaviour and activity (including the production of the routine and the mundane), enable spatial control, become apparent in Brett’s nuanced spatial configuring. They demonstrate that: “the concept of home cannot exist without the concept of homelessness. Similarly, Datta asserts that homeless people are “purposeful and active in their experiences, endeavouring to make sense of their circumstances, following their rational and appropriate choices, and engaging in the homemaking process.” She speculates that “homeless families can also create alternative domesticities in those places where they spend a part of their homeless histories.”

Brett exploits the malleability of urban space through representation, urban etiquette and phemonological experience. He manages his appearance carefully to ensure that he looks “normal so you don’t bring attention to yourself,” using clean, tidy clothing to disappear and effect an “existence predominantly separated from contact with other people.” Appearance, while deploying quite a different spatiality, is hence as architecturally effective as closing a door, pulling the blinds, or constructing a wall. Brett strategically makes himself invisible. He constructs himself as urban background in order to create his own private, undisturbed space to inhabit. As Hodgetts, et al. put it: Brett invokes the strategy of “hiding in sight” “Passing allows Brett to avoid being disturbed by others and maintain a reclusive existence.” Mallet’s description of the more conventional notion of home, as enabling “freedom from surveillance and external role expectations,” suggests that Brett’s strategy of being ordinary “can also be read as reflecting his efforts to transgress the borders between homeless and domiciled life worlds.” By being unnoticed society gives him space. Equally the production of this private space is dependent on the behaviours of other, to sustain a mutual ordinariness as a dominant currency of public space perpetrating a publicly-accessible “at-homeness,” defined by Seamon as “the usually unnoticed, taken-for-granted situation of being comfortable in, and familiar with, the everyday world in which one lives, and outside

42. Ayona Datta, “‘Homed’ in Arizona: The Architecture of Emergency Shelters,” Urban Geography 26, no. 6 (2005), 554.
43. Datta, “‘Homed’ in Arizona,” 537.
44. Datta, “‘Homed’ in Arizona,” 539.
47. Wardaugh identifies two major ways of being homeless: “the management of body space, or bodily resistance, and identity work or resistance.” The minimising or extension of bodily space: retreating into shadows or “claiming the streets as their own,” Wardaugh, “The Unaccommodated Woman,” 102, 103.
of which one is visiting.”51 The control of the space is hence partial to some kind of social contract of conformity.

Brett’s experience is echoed in the “strategic invisibility” deployed by emergency family shelters. As Datta notes: “While their internal layouts reproduce a model home, their strategic invisibility (through architectural language) … counters NIMBYism from the local community.”52 She documents one shelter located in a renovated motel. Local community concern was ameliated by assurances that “the shelter would not be noticed and hence would not affect them. Indeed, the shelter’s director at the time said, ‘We’re trying to remain as invisible as possible’.53 This shelter’s camouflage as motel enabled both clear property definition, enabling the homeless sheltered there to “redefine themselves as a cohesive domestic unit,”54 and the less-planned “frequent visits from single men in cars … because its architecture still represented a motel.”55 Hopper’s study of airports elucidates similar examples of “passing.” He notes that when homeless take care of their appearance and limit the time they spend in public view they can be “mistaken for stranded travelers.”56

The desire to not stand out or be noticed also attracts homeless to specific architectural spaces. While Hopper identifies the airport as “like a stay at the Concord [Hotel] compared to the city shelter system”57 because of the amenities (“the highest ratio of public restrooms to homeless users anywhere in the city,”58 snack bars and cafeterias, and sleeping accommodation),59 he also points to:

the most striking cultural distinction of the airport [which] is the degree to which some accepted canons of social behavior … are conditionally suspended …. Nowhere else may one observe, as accepted practice, ordinary citizens—some in quite casual attire, many with bags, and most looking a little worse for the wear—bedding down for the night in full public view … behavior that would normally be considered inappropriate—such as unpacking, sorting through, and repacking a bundle of clothing in a public thoroughfare—goes unremarked in a setting where the improvisations of harried travelers can make short work of established convention.60

Invisibility might be thought of as the effecting of thin, or two dimensional, space. Brett also calls on the three dimensions of acoustic space to create an enveloping oblivion and withdrawal. Hodgetts et al. note that “habitual activities such as walking and listening to an MP3 player … enable Brett to forge a semblance of home on the street.”61 This is not a coincidental spatial produc-
tion, and it is a spatially rich and complex one, as Brett uses sound, recorded in an interior acoustic space, to contain and envelop him, while he journeys around the streets of Auckland. He is astutely aware of the power of music to be both available and to produce a shelter over which he has precise control: “I can escape into the music … I can escape and not be me.”62 Music hence allows him to control when he feels homeless and when he feels at-home, and when he feels like someone else. It becomes a mobile mechanism by which Brett can adjudicate conditions of home. It is a “place [in Sixsmith’s words] of continuing stability from which one can go out into the world and return to in the knowledge of its being there for us.”63

Listening to the MP3 player becomes a stable reference point which is familiar and predictable and an assured “sense of certainty” within which Brett is “able to … dwell somewhere private and away from his very public and homeless existence,”64 but its certainty is also distinct from other aspects of Brett’s life which is less able to control. He enacts Mallett’s proposition that: “home … is represented as a spatial and relational realm from which people venture into the world and to which they generally hope to return.”65 Other objects also “provide personal anchorage points that foster a sense of self and belonging.”66 Hodgetts et al refer to books, needles, and sunglasses,67 while Datta describes the contradictions between “memories of home” evoked by domestic objects in homeless shelters for some, in contrast to these domestic objects’ representations of “qualities of a middle-class lifestyle” that other homeless people aspire to.68 She concludes that: “The differences in their homemaking tactics were influenced by memories of their past homes, their feelings of security in their present conditions, their level of autonomy, their current socioeconomic status, and the specific objects in their studio that each of them identified with to express attitudes of belonging. For Holly it was the furnishings, for Heather and Barbara it were the kitchenette and full bathroom, and for Paul it was the “tenants’ pan” that allowed him to establish his domesticity and parenthood.”69

69. Datta, “‘Homed’ in Arizona,” 552.

Conclusion: Towards an Architectural History of Homelessness

This initial examination of the spatiality of homelessness identifies a thread of potential architectural strategies to effect degrees of spatial control: invisibility via appearance and selection of context, the potency of objects to project habitation, acoustic enclosure and removal, and behavioural routine. They are more often depen-
dent on a nuanced understanding of cultural practice and social etiquette rather than physical building. There is no doubt that such mechanisms negotiate and transform space, and the documentation of such strategies used by homeless people historically would no doubt provide an interesting study—but could they comprise an architectural history?

Banham’s how emphasises architecture as a privileged cultural practice where appearance and meaning collapse into each other defining the arcane knowledge exclusive to architects. If architecture is a how, rather than a thing, then architectural problems are problems of doing and methodology, rather than material creation. Given the profession’s committed and continued aim of trade protectionism, architectural history’s prime concern might be necessarily political ones of how architecture maintains (or attempts) exclusion and exclusivity. Within this construction of architecture, homelessness accommodates central issues of concern to the discipline because home and homelessness respectively result from forms of exclusivity and exclusion. This parallels, rather than is, an architecturally-laden concern, suggesting that, with respect to architectural history, homelessness might occupy an historical half-way house. Parallels between architecture’s and homelessness’ spatial acuity, social marginality and heightened susceptibility to economic circumstance suggest a history of the spatial strategies of homelessness might provide an analogous, or counter, architectural history.

This is an initial proposition which intends in future to tease out in a more nuanced fashion the tracking of notions of exclusion and exclusivity in the architectural profession and in historical constructions of homelessness. The question Leach implicitly proposes, though, remains. Is the identification and exploration of an architectural historical problem sufficient for an architectural history? And can conventional material notions of architecture be satisfactorily displaced by Banham’s architectural how?